India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, recently concluded his first visit to China in seven years. The Indian PM was in Tianjin, to attend the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. On the sidelines, he had a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. It was another step towards the normalisation of ties between India and China.
Xi Jinping spoke of the Chinese dragon and Indian elephant “dancing together”. It invokes a vision of partnership and cooperation. But in recent years, the India-China relationship has been marred by conflict. Clashes at the border have caused Sino-Indian ties to crumble. But in Tianjin, both sides said that the border issue is behind them. It’s been a long journey towards the normalisation of ties, and some external factors are thought to have greased the wheels.
Narendra Modi’s Tianjin trip came days after tariffs on Indian exports to the US came into effect. US President Donald Trump initially slapped a 25% tariff rate on India for failing to work out a trade deal. He then imposed an additional 25% tariff on Indian goods, because India buys Russian crude oil. That comes to a whopping 50% tariff rate, one of the highest in the world.
Prior to this, New Delhi and Washington DC had been strengthening their relationship for decades. Successive governments worked to bring the two countries closer together. But Trump undid decades of hard work with his tariff war. So, India has been rethinking its geopolitical alignment, and it seems Narendra Modi decided to improve ties with China to counter the US. His trip to Tianjin was a clear message to the Americans, telling them that if the US continues to undermine their partnership, India has other options. China has welcomed this posturing. Beijing seems to want to put the border issue on the backburner, and focus on cooperation with India; especially economic cooperation.
India and China share a 3,500 border, but neither side can agree where the border actually is. There are two major disputed regions; in the West there’s Aksai Chin, and the East there’s Arunachal Pradesh.
India claims Aksai Chin because of a line drawn by a British official in the mid 1800s. The surveyor’s name was William Johnson. The British colonial government of India tasked Johnson with mapping the Aksai Chin region. He set off on his expedition in 1865, and his findings were published two years later. The border he drew came to be known as the Johnson line. By the end of World War 1, the British were officially using the Johnson line, despite the fact that this boundary was never settled with China, and officially it was considered “undemarcated”.
India inherited the mess when it became independent. New Delhi continued to use the British-era boundary, though it did not exercise direct control over Aksai Chin. The inhospitable terrain meant that the newly independent India did not have the resources or manpower to establish permanent control over the region. China eventually started building infrastructure in Aksai Chin by the late 1950s, including a road that cut right through the territory. When India protested against this, China asserted its claim on Aksai Chin, setting the stage for future conflicts.
The second disputed area was Arunachal Pradesh, or the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) as it was known back then. This dispute also arose because of the British. In 1914, a tripartite convention was held in Shimla. It was a border negotiation between British India, Tibet, and Tibet’s suzerain, China. The British representative was a man named Henry McMahon. And his name is still on the line that separates India and China in the East; the McMahon Line. Up till 1914, Tibet exercised control over what is today the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. But McMahon wanted to extend British India’s frontiers, so he negotiated a new boundary. One where Tawang and the rest of Arunachal fell within India’s borders. Tibet agreed to the McMahon line during the Convention in Shimla, but China did not.
Once India became independent, it sent its forces to consolidate the border. In 1951, it pushed the last Tibetan officials out of Tawang, and solidified control over the region. China did not accept India’s control, and it had always rejected the McMahon line. So, Arunachal Pradesh became the second major border flashpoint.
In the early years after India’s independence, there was still some hope for a peaceful resolution to the border dispute. In 1954, India and China signed the Panchsheel Agreement, which included the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” between India and China. But relations between the nations broke down by 1959, when India gave refuge to the Dalai Lama as he was fleeing Tibet. The Dalai Lama, and about 80,000 Tibetan refugees made their way to India via Arunachal Pradesh. They set up a government in exile, which remains to this day. The Chinese were livid, and a series of border skirmishes followed.
The hostilities finally erupted into a full-scale war in 1962. On October 20, 1962, Chinese forces entered both Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Over the course of a month, they advanced through both territories. The Chinese forces kept advancing until they reached their claim lines; their version of the border. It was a major defeat for India. Having achieved its objective, China unilaterally declared a ceasefire, which came into effect on November 21, 1962.
Once the dust settled, it became clear that China had consolidated its control over Aksai Chin. However, because of China’s withdrawal after the ceasefire, India still held Arunachal Pradesh. This has been the de facto border ever since. It’s known as the Line of Actual Control, or LAC. India and China have had multiple faceoffs since the 1962 war, but the LAC has remained frozen in place.
In 1967, Indian forces clashed with the Chinese at the border of Sikkim. Skirmishes took place at the Nathu La and Cho La passes. India was victorious.
In October 1975, there was a clash at Tulung La, at the Arunachal-China border. Four Indian soldiers were killed in that skirmish. That would be the last time there were fatalities for almost half a century.
Between 1986 and 87, there was a tense military stand-off at Sumdorong Chu. This was also at the border between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet. But the Sumdorong Chu stand-off ended diplomatically, and what followed were almost 25 years of relative peace.
Chinese incursions took place from time to time, but there wasn’t a major stand-off until 2013. However, in April that year, Chinese troops set up camp about 19 kilometres inside Indian territory. Beyond the de facto border, the LAC. The Chinese soldiers were confronted by Indian troops, and the stand-off lasted for about three weeks before both sides pulled back.
There were similar faceoffs in 2014 and 2015, but the next major incident took place in 2017. In Doklam.
Doklam is disputed territory between China and the mountain Kingdom of Bhutan. On June 16, 2017, China brought troops and equipment to Doklam, to extend a road it had previously built in the disputed territory. The extension was taking place near the Indian border.
India responded by sending about 270 soldiers and bulldozers to Doklam, to stop China from constructing its road. India did this in coordination with Bhutan, as India supports the Kingdom’s territorial claims.
India was also afraid that further Chinese encroachment in Doklam could threaten Indian territory further South. Specifically, the narrow Siliguri corridor, which has been likened to a “Chicken’s Neck”. The stand-off at Doklam lasted for more than two months. But eventually, both India and China withdrew their troops.
So, border tensions between India and China had been on the rise since 2013. But simultaneously, attempts were made to improve ties. There were notable meetings, such as Xi Jinping’s visit to Gujarat in 2014, Narendra Modi’s informal meeting with the Chinese President in Wuhan in 2018, and Xi Jinping’s visit to Mamallapuram in Tamil Nadu in 2019.
The Wuhan and Mamallapuram meetings took place after Doklam. So, there was an earnest attempt to bury the hatchet. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tried to cultivate a personal relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Perhaps in the hope that it would prevent any major conflict. But despite the outreach by the Indian Prime Minister the worst was still to come.
In May 2020, clashes broke out all along the border. Skirmishes took place at Pangong Lake, at Muguthang in Sikkim, and most notoriously, at Galwan Valley. What began as fistfights, escalated into stone pelting and melee battles with sticks. Old agreements between the two countries meant that the soldiers didn’t open fire, but it wasn’t enough to prevent casualties.
On June 15, 2020, 20 Indian soldiers were killed in Galwan Valley. There were Chinese fatalities as well, though the exact number is disputed. These were the first casualties at the India-China border in about 50 years, and they pushed India-China ties to an all-time low.
India and China began trying to stabilise the border situation after the 2020 clashes. There were multiple rounds of talks to reach a disengagement at the border. There was a setback in 2022, because of clashes along the border at Arunachal Pradesh. Dozens of soldiers from both sides were injured in the melee that ensued. The major breakthrough finally came all the way in October 2024, days before Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping met in Russia. That meeting set the stage for the camaraderie on display at Tianjin.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke about peace at the India-China border. Xi Jinping spoke about the need for unity amid turbulence in the international landscape. The two leaders seemed to be projecting a unified front.
India and China are prominent members of the Global South. Both nations already have to cooperate in multilateral forums like the SCO, and of course BRICS. These groupings club India and China together with other countries that are facing Trump’s ire, like Brazil and South Africa. And countries that face outright hostility from the wider West, such as Russia and Iran. As members of the SCO and BRICS, India and China might be better served by putting aside their differences. It would help the blocs coordinate better to thwart threats from US and the West.
There’s also an economic incentive for India to normalise ties with China. The Chinese government exercises broad control over trade. It has already agreed to address Indian concerns over certain export curbs. Further normalisation could open the floodgates and allow more critical materials to enter India, and it could also pave the way for more Indian goods to go the other way.
Despite the 2020 clashes, India did not stop trading with China. The value of Chinese imports surged by over 45% in the year following Galwan, and it has been growing steadily since. Conversely, Chinese demand for Indian goods hasn’t changed much. The result is an ever-widening trade deficit. India's largest with any country. Normalising ties might boost Indian exports to China, and thus help lower the deficit.
So, for India, there are clear advantages to normalisation. And China walks away with a major new partner, shoring up its credentials as a rising superpower. But the border issue isn’t something that can be ignored forever. Resolving the India-China border issue will require tough choices, and compromise.
Will Narendra Modi or Xi Jinping be the ones to finally solve this decades-old dispute? Or will they pass down the problem to the next leaders? Because without a resolution, the India-China border dispute will probably do what its always done. Derail peace, progress and prosperity.